QUESTION 1

1. Under a Nash equilibrium for a two-person simultaneous game,

   	A.	both players maximize their collective (total) payoff
   	B.	each player maximizes his own payoff given the action of the other player
   	C.	one player maximizes his payoff but the other player does not maximize
   	D.	there must be one likely outcome for the game

QUESTION 2

1. Please refer to the simultaneous two-player game associated with Questions 3-5 at the end of Chapter 15. What are the strategies of the players under the Nash equilibrium?

   	A.	Both firms advertise
   	B.	Both firms don’t advertise
   	C.	Superstore advertises and Megastore does not advertise
   	D.	Megastore advertises and Superstore does not advertise

QUESTION 3

1. Please refer to the two-person simultaneous game associated with Questions 8-9 at the end of Chapter 15. Is this game a Prisoners’ Dilemma?

   	A.	Yes
   	B.	No

QUESTION 4

1. Please refer to the game associated with Question 10 at the end of Chapter 15. Suppose this game is a two-player simultaneous game. How many Nash equilibria are associated with this game?

   	A.	Zero
   	B.	One
   	C.	Two
   	D.	Three

QUESTION 5

1. Please refer to the sequential salary game associated with Individual Problem 15-4 at the end of Chapter 15 — the tree-form of the game is provided in the diagram at the top of page 202. What is the Nash equilibrium for this game?

   	A.	The employer makes a high offer and the employee accepts
   	B.	The employer makes a low offer and the employee accepts
   	C.	The employer makes a high offer and the employee walks
   	D.	The employer makes a low offer and the employee walks