Table of Contents
Theoretical Framework 3
Proposed Methods and Time Line 5
Questionnaire Survey 6
Examination of workstation safety 7
Literature Review 9
Methods for assessing the external factors of incident reporting 11
EVR congruence model 11
STEEPLE Analysis 12
SWOT Analysis 13
Aetiology of Incidents 15
Fire Department Risk Management 17
Incident Reporting 18
Underreporting of Incidents 19
Reasons for Incident underreporting 20
Cultural reasons 20
Company barriers to incidence reporting 21
Reasons due to Fear while reporting incidences 21
Hindrances due to organizational learning 21
This is a research proposal that attempts to look at the incidences at Saudi Aramco fire department when compared to the reporting rate and desired to find out reasons for not reporting. The proposal was spread to 5% of the general population and a good section of the employees who have good experience with the company. None of the officials has reported the injuries or incidence this was since reporting was thought of as mandatory and that the procedure to be applied was very difficult.
Injuries caused by fire and other objects are serious risk issues in the employees at the fire department. The study looks at the fire fighters, fire instructors, engineers, protection advisors and marshals as they are the main persons in this department. The fire department staffs are accorded skills in handling injuries of various victims which was part of the first aid.
A number of studies have shown issues related to incidence at the fire department have been great as well as high non reporting rate of the incidences. When these studies are undertaken we are at a good position to acquire the reasons and the causative aspects. It is hence with these data available that we are able to acquire means of hindering future injuries.
The theoretical framework of this research proposal is founded on the safety at the fire station work that applies the safety standards. The company has witnessed a high rate of incidences that are related to failure to follow precise safety processes that are listed in the standards and have to be applied before undertaking any activity. An unsafe tendency may be a mistake or violation. The identification and eradication of the fundamental reasons of the mistakes and violations formed at the sharp point of the department is vital in hindering accidents from taking place. The most notable form of unsafe tendencies that bring about electrical accidents is shown below.
Figure 1: The most common immediate causes of fire incidences.
The research was applied as an integrate part of reactive incidence and proactive risk assessment: on a certain part the research was based on prior knowledge relating to the reasons of fire incidents. Moreover fire incidences related information is collection from the participants in the process of the research. On the other side, the research focuses on proactive incidences risk assessment and the notification of the immediate and underlying risks. Reported fire experts’ incidences are limited and there is proof of underreporting. The integration of the stated techniques brings about precise data relating to the incidences taking place and the risks the result. In fire-related work – allowed to be undertaken by experts only- the likelihood that the fire employee is in contact to fire brings about constant risk for a deadly fire incidence. This research looked into the assessment of the reasons of the major fire risks.
The incidences are due to a number of causes. Reason (1997) splits these reasons into active failures and latent state. The active failures are the immediate reasons of the fire department incidents, normally not safe tendencies made by workers, that are easy to note in accident studies and hence basically known at the start of research. Endeavored to note in this research are the latent, fundamental conditions that are dormant or change with time. The fundamental reasons are basically due to choices made by the management, or authorities. The reasons are normally intangible and others may not be noted. The figure below shows the tangible and intangible incidences that arise from the varied levels in the department and its setting.
Safety management is currently being applied in high pressure of a setting that insists on quick outcome over a long period commitment, and has to deal with difficulties brought about by gradual changes and combination of difficult models. The problems with the top management and the varied levels in the department safety tendencies go on to play a vital part, impacting the behaviour of the staff in regions like accident reporting (Probst and Estrada 2010), safety behaviour and acquisition of safety values. According to Krause and Hidley (1989) the employee tendency is a function of the management model that functions in the organizational culture. Safe tendency needs knowledge, skills, motivation and probability to behave in a safe manner and risk taking is vital section in occupational incidents (Salminen 1994).
Proposed Methods and Time Line
The research was applied in three stages: questionnaire, interviews and assessment of the work station. All of the stages looked into the identification of hazards and fundamental reasons of the fire incidents and injuries.
2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006
In reference to Macaskill and Driscoll (1998), the data on minor incidents are not consistently present from incident figures and ought to be acquired with surveys. Additionally, fire incidents or injuries report assessment rarely are above the immediate reasons for the accidents – which is the focus of the research. Since there were people with experience and study outcome of underreporting of the fire incidents, information acquired were at best collected using a questionnaire.
The interview on the other hand opts to bring to the open the probability to research more and in-depth matters. This research interviews are applied so as to enhance the data acquired from the questionnaire and to study the fire accidents-connected matters handled to be very difficult to be asked in the questionnaire.
Base on the questionnaire and interview, the fire duties were selected for more assessment. The duties selected were risky. The application of the safety processes at the time of applying the duties was assessed.
The project was assessed on the focus of the risk perception: fire experts are the best foundation of information. Relating to fire hazards they incur. Moreover, the project advisory committee was applied in strategizing the three stages. The project teams symbolized the companies that look into the occupational and fire safety in the everyday work, as well as the relevant sections, accident insurance among others.
The questionnaire sort to acquire views on the safety issues faced. The research acquired a sample of the questionnaire from private documents as a systematic sample in January 2004, reaching 1400 names. The people were from varied sections of the fire department: fire protection, fire fighters, instructors, engineers, advisors, planning group and fire marshals. The contact group will have to offer their contact data for the questionnaire to be sent to them.
The first part was based on check list while the second part sought to get comments. The questions were 38 in number focusing on varied issues on reporting of fire incidence and injuries in the department. The survey involve was set for 20 minutes per participants.
The interview was carried out both for the top management and the staff in the fire department. Generally 20 interview groups were made which was distributed equally to all of the sections of the department. The questions were passed on a separate paper from the multi choice paper as well as an open ended question.
The interview was undertaken at winter and spring time 2004-2005. The interview was focused at getting an understanding of the safety issues brought about during the survey. The issues that were left out in the questionnaire were integrated in the interviews. The questions were composed of background questions and 15 open questions. The questions were based on safety, contracting and outsourcing, fire safety and education.
The background questions were based on size of the organization and background of the people involved like their role and experience. The open ended questions were applied and later multi-choice interview questions. The interview took about 2 hours and was based on conversation grounds.
Examination of workstation safety
The safety process was modeled through use of outcome of the questionnaire and interviews, the experience of the safety specialists. These questions had optional sections; what to do before starting to work, making the location safe, what to do after working among others. This was applied in 2005-2006 so as to focus on work tasks that are seen as risky.
The strategy was to first assess the duties and note the hazard and later look into the work of the experts. It was quite hard to for the department to acquire people that were willing to get involved as well as time taking.
The study did not go into extensive research of the incidents. Though this would have taken up resources, the incidents may be acquired from a voluntary ground that may affect the outcome, and more so the instances with dreadful implications that would have brought about anonymity since they are scarce. There were discussions of fire accidents and injuries which were tried during the interviews though the interviewees showed some clear aspect of reluctance in bringing forth an instance of such happening form their work setting.
About all of the information that is acquired was qualitative in form. The quantification of this information brought about a precise form of uncertainty, more so when evaluating the statistical importance. This ought to be applied when interpreting the outcome. There also had to be some element of the outcome which displayed statistical contrast in the groups, certain groups were composed of a small sample.
Considering that objectivity is connected to scientific research, it is practically almost not acquired in whole: the estimation procedure is subjective when an individual chooses the aspects of estimation, and acquires, assess and interpret the information (Johnson and Scholes, 2006). In this proposal research objectivity was acquired through the help of agreement as well as skilled point of view, which are mostly applied backed by theory. In the research the individual in charge for assessing the information and interpreting the outcome was a safety expert and not a fire expert. This will impact the outcome, for example the intuitive categorization of the qualitative information. This is more so in the categorization of the outcome to the question regarding the risky undertaking if duties and installation of equipment which ought to be known that this is reliant on mode of work.
The survey had a response rate that not often went beyond 60%. The length of the survey was composed of complicated questions that needed more time to look into so as to formulate a better deduction. In regard to the open questions, the person being interviewed does not have the mode of putting down long replies. Hence telephone surveys were impacted by the quality of changes in the recording of responses. This impacted the outcome to the questions: there is a possibility that the reasons for lack of putting in place of emergency appliances could have been lengthier. On the other hand, the interviews could have been time acquiring and hence dropped to a low the number of people involved. The outcome may have been more skewed as the acquisition of data would be anonymous hence affecting the desire to focus more on the reasons for unsafe tendencies.
The interviews assessments of the safety measures were undertaken to sections of the departments that were willing to get involved and offer their staff the time on the research. This meant that the people taking part in the sample were not a representative sample of the fire department as a whole, but a organizations that are in support of safety. This may be impacted the outcome of the interviews and assessments that are optimistic that what is actually being faced.
On the grounds of research evidence taking into focus, the under reporting of incidents and injuries is a global trend. It has confirmatory studies undertaken in a number of countries. As one would have intended, the tendencies based on the reasons for the rate of incidents and reporting varies from one nation to another, reflecting the cultural variation and contrast in the reporting models and legislation.
The reasons for incidents varied by company, variation in the labour force survey showed that the reporting varied from one sector to another. It is common that reasons for reporting of fire incidences were high in extraction and utility sectors while it was quite limited in hotels and businesses. Studies undertaken in the US and UK created proof of contrasting levels of underreporting of incidents and injuries in construction sites, health centers and voluntary areas.
The company size is another factor that affects the reasons for under reporting. In the UK and US there are agreements that are formed in the researchers that small organizations are highly bound to under report or even not to report. The reasons accorded were lack of being informed of the legal reporting needs in the smaller companies and being done with the important documentation that accord high number of problems as opposed to the bigger companies.
There are other varied reasons that are rigid that affected the involvement in the reporting method for the top office and the staff. Among them was the absence of safety incentive measures that accorded rewards for a drop in the size of the work station incidence and injuries, which have been applied in the departments with the purpose of elevating safety records and trimming safety-based costs. Though, it is vivid that a minimal amount of agreement was present in terms of the efficiency or value incentives to elevate safety routine in the work station instance.
Generally, there is an agreement in terms of research that incentives can elevate performance, though inherent issues may arise due to the trend that they are applied. It ought to be treasured that it is a one-size-fits-all method that may not be successful. This is since it is believed that such methods do not go down well. Hence it is imperative that such methods allow for dynamic application. Such incentives may similarly not bring about motivations; however the manner that they are brought forth would impact the performance evaluation that may impact the probability of the adverse implications. The programs that are reliant on the result are popular hence better to manage and may elevate injury figures. The aspect of underreporting is most where incentives are in the form of finance.
Safety culture is of consensus that underreporting of incidents is advanced by the availability of a poor safety culture, lack of models for reporting hazardous incidents. An issue that is vital to the effectiveness of application of any reporting model is required for dynamic and clear organization obligation to the model. Hence under reporting is probable to be symptomatic of poor organization obligation to make sure a secure work station, as diligent companies with a rigid obligation to safety, make it vivid to every staff and top management that under report of incidents is undesirable.
Research has shown that under reporting of work-based injuries can bring about absence of skills of reporting needs, administrative hindrances and insufficient reporting methods. More precisely, the unsatisfactory reporting methods are termed to as by the employees to be time taking.
Methods for assessing the external factors of incident reporting
EVR congruence model
The first method to be taking into consideration when noting the contextual aspects that have an effect on incident reporting was E-V-R (environmental-values-resources) congruence. This method offers a better structure to assess what the top leaders have to acquire so as to form and keep departmental success. The EVR brings forth the setting as a base of chances and risks – outside aspects and that resources involve good and bad, strategic ability that align together, or do not align, the desires of the setting (Thompson, 2001). If a company looks into the company setting in the inner setting only, this may bring about strategic change (Johnson and Scholes, 2006).
Figure 4: EVR congruence method (source: Thompson, 2001)
The EVR method makes it possible for the top leadership in a department to integrate the matters from the outside setting and align them with the inner wealth and values. The bigger the congruence the bigger the probability that a company is controlling its assets to align the vital aspects controlled by the setting (Thompson, 2001). Though, the application of the model takes too much time. The other problem is that the model does not note the implication of leadership in hindering strategic change.
The business setting of a company involves every outside influences that impact the choices that it makes and performance (Grant, 2008). The STEEPLE analysis notes the controlling forces for transformation that offer macro assessment of the company and may be used for any company. The structure can be applied to note the coming tendencies.
The STEEPLE model may be used in the fire department and offers the vital controls for alterations in incident reporting, and this is vital when taking to fact the advancement of severe incident reporting legislation.
The STEEPLE assessment makes it possible for a big number of aspects to be managed, though, offered the big size of outside influences it is not feasible to assess them together. The limitation of the model is that it may bring about information excessiveness and may not be better to acquire. The model does not assist leadership of the department to differentiate important data from others and hence is not useful to assist managers to acquire strategic choices. The model acquires that outside forces will be appropriate in the setting and acquires limited account of the matters that pass through boundaries; outside drivers may lead to misperception.
This stands for Strength, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats. This assessment helps to assess the vital matters from a company setting and the strategic ability of a company that effects on the strategic advancement (Johnson and Scholes, 2006). This method is vital as a ground that one is able to acquire strategic choices. The down side to this model is that it does not need variation of the company competitors.
The prior three model are vital to the research goal, since they may be used to the NHS with no complexity; hence are applied to create the ground for conceptual model.
Vital Matters relating to incident Reporting and Reasons for Incident Reporting
Research undertaken all over the world has brought forth the idea that clinical errors are a risk to the staff at the fire department (WHO, 2004). In the fire department, a great number of happenings take place with one in ten persons getting injured, leading to a payout of several millions in settling negligence matters (DH, 2000). Based on large scale research by Bolsin et al (2007) the yearly price of the adverse happenings in the fire department is about $10 billion in the American state and $9 in the Australian country among others. In reference to NPSA almost half of these incidents may be hindered (NPSA, 2003).
Research states that this numbers offer a good direction of the vital scale of the issues due to the under reporting of clinical incidents and injuries (O’Dowd, 2006). This aggresses with the outcome of other researchers (Goldie et al, 2003; Firth-Cozens, 2002).
In the figure below the iceberg shows the total sum of numbers of incidents that take place. Mistakes may be interrupted prior to the impacting the employees. The errors that take place may not be identified. Some mistakes may not be reported where the patients has not been injured. In such instances where the employees of the fire department undergo an unexpected happing due to a mistake the incident is bound to take place and be reported.
Figure 5: Incident reporting iceberg (Source: DH, 2004)
In the above figure the size of unreported mistakes far exceeds the real size of mistakes reported. Getting to know why the injuries is vital and may bring about the limitation of injures or death that take place due to unavoidable incidents annually.
Aetiology of Incidents
Incidents are due to unplanned changes in the model management, (Koorneef and Hale, 1997). These changes bring about unintended procedures that, if not hindered, may bring about an injury (Hendrick 1987). Getting to know why incidents take place is acquiring appreciation in a number of organizations as well as the fire departments around the world. Research brings forth those companies with extreme reported incidents have brought about a rigid reporting tendency (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001). This is a vital point that one has to take to mind as human choices and tendencies undertake a vital function in all of the incidents (DH, 2000).
Reason (2005) states that human mistakes as the failure of strategized tendencies to acquire an objective. Reason’s model of company accident causation was advanced for application in difficult company models, as a method of understanding the connection between the several aspects that are in the start of accidents and to note the methods of accident hindrance.
Reason’s (2005) model notes a number of concepts that are need to comprehend the Aetiology company incidents. They may be composed of: organizational matters, work station issues, person and penetrated defences.
Figure 6 notes that company procedure have a direct implication on the manner incidents advance in companies. Choices acquired at optimum levels of a company- while well considered can be wrong and hence bring about the ability for hidden issues in the company. Hidden mistakes bring about weaknesses that elevate the possibility of unsafe tendencies taking place. If management methods are not working the result is incident or injury.
Figure 6: Accident causation model (Source: Reason, 2005)
Taking to fact that there are latent failures or errors there are also active failures. These are not safe tendencies that are undertaken by the people at the ‘sharp end’ of a structure and whose tendencies may have an immediate impact. Reason states that there two forms of ‘Unsafe Act’: mistakes and violations (Figure 7)
Mistakes can be based on skills focus blunder and memory lapse. This is composed of undesired variations from what could have been a good strategy (Reason, 1995). Mistakes brought by errors and interruption are complex to do away with totally: hence they are hard to manage.
It is hard to do away with all threats more so human mistakes. Mistakes cannot be done away with any form of coaching, familiarity or incentive, though these are less possible. Severe happenings are not commonly the outcome of a mistake.
The incident causation aspect has been acquired and used in health setting (Vincent et al 1999), considering that certain precise attributes if the systems. In health and fire system, severe cases are common due to a number of mistakes or evasion that brings about vital incidents.
Fire Department Risk Management
Risk is termed to as the probability of facing a loss. In the fire department, risk control is more so based with harnessing data that may limit injury or death, financial loss and losing reputation. This data can be acquired through reporting of fire incidents; though under reporting of incidents hinders the acquisition of important data and put the lives of people at risk.
Risk control in the fire department is a procedure that changes and has limited empirical work to inform its advancement; a literature focus has brought forth a reduced theoretical setting. There is an absence of scientific basis for the model of risk control training model (Thomas, 2004). Error control upheld incident reporting can offer a valid model that the fire department can look into so as to advance the safety of tis staff.
The application of risk matric when integrated with risk list is important as it helps when strategizing a planning risk plan.
In reference to DH (2000) the base acquired by incident reporting is: evadable failures, unexpected actions taking place and the incidents that come about a lapse in standard care in a number of companies. This does not bring about viable corrections.
The Heinrich pyramid was advanced with regard to work in such companies and has modeled the present work in incident reporting (Connolly, 2006) Figure 10. Heinrich approximated a comparison in company of a major injury and other smaller injuries to other accidents that did not result to injuries. To a certain range the fire department reporting model can be judged through proportion of smaller incidents to a severe reported incidents: the bigger the proportion of smaller incidents reported, the improved reporting model is taking place.
Figure 10: Heinrich pyramid (Source: DH, 2000)
Incident reporting has been noted as a vital aspect in setting up a working risk management tendency and is a vital aspect if governance (DH, 2000). A number of fire departments in US and UK are presently bringing about risk control tendencies like reporting errors.
In reference to Cook (2000), no research has shown the effectiveness of near miss reporting in fire staff; fire fighters. Though, experience in other regions shows the value of ‘near miss’ reporting that does not compare with the greatest practice in other regions.
Reporting models are important in offering data on what ground trend assessment and recommendations. The report system takes a lot of time to finish at time forms that are not done are offered. There is bound to be time drag from when incidents takes place are reported and the discussions regarding them. Additionally these reporting systems are reliant on the desire of the employees to finish them. Incident reporting is applied mainly by fire officials (Kingston et al, 2004). The presentation of an online reporting model at Saudi Aramco brings about an elevated reporting of the employees, since it offers help on being done with the form (Anderson, 2007).
Underreporting of Incidents
Underreporting is a companywide matter in Aramco fire department and is a hindrance to elevating the safety of the staff (O’Dowd, 2006). The aspect of underreporting is not just an issue in Saudi Arabia as well UK and US. Barach and Small (2000) reported that underreporting of severe happenings in US is 52-98% yearly. In Saudi Arabia it was approximated that several fire incidents had been reported in 2005-2006, though it was approximated that 22% of the injuries and 39% were not reported. Though a good number of professional sections are managed by policies, under reporting and is attributed to as the accepted code of behavior. This is since the setting that upholds the reporting of mistakes had not been advanced.
The fire experts code of practice opts for the raise of issues more so incident reporting. The bodies related to this offers guidance to the professional, there however lacks the incident reporting in the standards. This brings about the advancement of limited standards on the matter and hence limits the vividness of the incident reporting.
Reasons for Incident underreporting
A review of literature offered a detailed focus of varied aspects in study impacting the desire of fire staff to report incidents. Though, a good number of literatures denote to fire staff; there is absence of connected sources to related departments.
There are issues on the function of incident reporting and its ability to elevate the safety of the employees. In regard to Leape (2002) no managed research has been undertaken to estimate if elevated incident reporting bringing to a drop in mistakes. There is presence of data that agree with the importance of incidence reporting in limiting the frequency of happenings. Reporting of incidents will result to limited incidents and costs.
The hindrances to incidence reporting (Barach and Small, 2000) stated that limited hindrances on information acquisition acquired are present. They state that there is absence of vividness on what is involved in reporting of cases and this affected the reporting of incidents. Several reasons for under reporting from the literature are: cultural hindrances, organizational hindrances, hindrances to reporting due to fear and hindrances to department learning from incidents.
Company culture is vital to incident reporting, from making sure that incidents are noted and reported using embedded method. The absence of trust can be a rigid aspect to report incidents. Several researches undertaken in the fire and emergency departments has shown that culture of being quite is the behaviour being acquired. On the other hand, Evans (2006) the cultural aspect did not acquire that fear was not part of this.
There is also cultural blame. This affected the reporting nature of the employees (Waring, 2005). The top leaders had to get someone to blame when an incident took place. Fear was another factor that hinders reporting of incidents. It was seen as a cultural taboo to report an injury.
Company barriers to incidence reporting
This involves the model, the communication sets and sets of responsibility. The fire department is big and is involved of a number of sections hence better to organize. This model though involve filter of data at every level. Data can be filtered to a wide range that the employees are not conversant of what it taking place or the manner to report incidents. The smaller managers are not conversant of the plans in place and it only takes place at the lower level. Similarly, a lot of time is taken in reporting.
Reasons due to Fear while reporting incidences
Fear is a known hindrance in reporting due to resulting errors. This research was undertaken in US where legislations have more implications.
Hindrances due to organizational learning
Organizational learning is noted as a social aspect that a person relies on expertise with other companies acquire. The learning procedure is hence a procedure of personal and general learning in the company and outside of it. The lack of effective learning in the fire department at the Saudi Aramco is due to the blame culture, no records are acquired and limited culture of self-success. The fire department will have to acquire these aspects so as to be a success. The figure below shows the learning process presented by DH (2000).
Figure 12: Key stages in learning from severe happenings (Source: DH, 2000)
The learning in a company is facilitated by the organization for its staff and validly changes itself and the instance. The learning is where individuals go on to grow their ability so as to bring about an outcome that they need and how to learn and apply better (Senge, 2006). For better learning there ought to be leadership, company culture, staff training and technology models.
Anderson, P. (2007). Modifying incident reporting- and looking beyond it to identify harm, Special report: incident reporting Health Care Risk Report,pp14-15.
Barach, P. and Small, S. (2000) Reporting and preventing medical mishaps: lessons from non- medical near miss reporting systems, British Medical journal, vol. 320, No 7237, pp 759- 763.
Bolsin. S, (2007). Why reporting adverse incidents is the right thing for doctors to do, Health Care Risk Report, pp12-13