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Epistemology and Metaphysics 101

Introduction

Real human experiences have distinctive characteristics that differentiate them from the consciousness states that are defined by the complex thought processes. Actual experiences do not only accredit human existence, but they also enable humans to interact with the physical world and appreciate the existence of other forms. Usually, humans are triggered to become conversant with different events once they realize that they are in actual existence. Since historical times, the concept of human experience has been under philosophical scrutiny and seemingly, various philosophers have explored inherent dynamics for various reasons. The concept of sense data has particularly been contentious because of the implications that it has on these states.

While some philosophers have argued that the physical world can be perceived, others indicate that this ability is too complex and is beyond human capacity. Yet others maintain that although this is possible, it is compounded by various inconsistencies with respect to the actual appearances of the perceived objects. Besides being characterized by human thought processes and experiences, sense data can not entirely accredit the belief in the physical world. From his point of view, Russell presumed that the belief in the external world can not be based on any direct experience or sense data. This is true and this essay demonstrates that counter arguments are faulty.

The sense data conception constitutes the qualities and characteristics that humans primitively and immediately conceive about the physical objects. These include shape, texture, temperature, color and so forth. The relative theory stipulates that these perceived characteristics assume the functions of physical objects. Thus for instance, the perception that a sheep has soft fur in this regard makes the human mind associate it with attributes of warmth and softness. This is faulty because the human mind would believe that the sheep is the one responsible for the warmth and softness. This happens regardless of one being unsure of the very existence of the sheep.

Russell objects this conception and assumes a logical argument. In this, the existence of the physical objects presumes perception rather than perception occurring prior to actual experience. Fundamentally, this is true because a mere perception can not underscore the existence of a physical object that has the perceived qualities. At this point, sense data can be considered as just a state of the mind and does not have any implications on the real existence of the physical world.

Further, Russell indicates that the aspect of private and public space also disqualifies the sense data from the presumed function. In this respect, Russell argues that unlike the physical world that assumes a public space, the sense data is largely private and hence subjective in nature (Russell 63). This can not be used to define the real attributes of a physical world that is already in existence. In stead, the latter needs to shape the perceptions of the former. Coupled by the realization that the peoples’ mind and what is perceived in them is unknown to the mind of an individual, it becomes difficult for one to align individual thoughts and perception to that of the entire public. In this respect therefore, the possibility of having a uniform perception of the external world is impossible. Since the world itself has distinct features, there are inherent inconsistencies that undermine the credibility of the sense data theory.

Russell’s preposition is consistent with the proposition of the representative realism that believes that sense data can not imply the existence of the external world because of the lack of objectivity and proof. In this regard, humans perceive physical things differently even in actuality. This is usually influenced by various aspects that range from the position of viewing the objects to the level of integrity of the individual. In addition, it postulates that humans do not have the ability to perceive the external world directly; rather this is made possible through the sense data. Whereas naïve realists perceive before they see the external world, representative realists base their perception on the sensory representation of the external world. In essence, perceptions are triggered by the inherent qualities of the external world that then provide the basement for inference.

From his point of view, Descartes argues that sense data can accurately represent the primary qualities of external objects, events and properties. However, he cites that the sense data of perceptual illusions and secondary qualities does not accurately represent the properties, objects or events in the external world. Secondary qualities usually produce sensations and are intrinsic of the observers. Typical examples include sound, smell, color and taste. The relative knowledge stems from such qualities is therefore highly objective and can not be used to provide objective and factual information about events and objects found in the external world.

This is regardless of the fact that it might be greatly influenced by the primary qualities of the external world. To counter the intrinsic shortcomings, Descartes supports the employment of critical realism that adopts the concept of representation. Notably, this is consistent with the provisions of the theory of perception. At this point, it is certain that humans can not accurately describe an item that they are acquainted with. Although this has been objected on the premise that apriori knowledge enables one to do so, it can be argued that such knowledge is based on false objectivity. In this regard, it is possible that such information was provided by someone who had an experience with the object and can therefore be classified as being subjective.

Conclusion

Human experiences often enable one to have an actual understanding of the real and objective world. Real experiences can be differentiated from unconscious experiences because the former is objective. Sense data theory presumes that the perceive attributes are an actual representation of the qualities of the external world. As it has come out from the study, this is faulty because sense data and real experiences assume private and public status respectively. Thus one can not be able to effectively discern the state of mind of another and light their individual thoughts to this.

The inherent subjectivity disqualifies the former as a credible source. Russell’s preposition of representative realism is credible as it is only from observations that humans can develop accurate perceptions of the events, properties and objects in the external world. Where this is not possible, the sensory representation of the world can go a long way in enhancing objective perceptions. This assumption is also consistent with Descartes’ point of view with regards to critical realism. I strongly, agree with Russell that the understanding of the objective external world can not be entirely based on sense data.

Work Cited

Russell, Bertrand. Mysticism and Logic. London: Unwin Books, 1917.