Needs to be plagiarism free! The Teheran reactor has been functioning with LEU fuel since 1993 (Teheran Nuclear Research Center par. 9-10).

Iran has been secretively using this reactor to organize such functions that likely connected Iran’s attempts to develop nuclear weapons.&nbsp. It is clear that without informing the IAEA Iran irradiated uranium oxide (UO2) limits in the TRR and shifted plutonium in glove boxes at Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) laboratories.&nbsp. Iran had also agreed that it developed a minor quantity of polonium-210 in the TRR in the early 1990s via the irradiation of bismuth limits.&nbsp. Polonium 210 is a popular radioactive stuff employed in a beryllium-polonium neutron initiator, which begins a series of reactions in a nuclear weapon (Teheran Nuclear Research Center par. 7-8).

Although Iran asserted that the polonium was developed as a component of research for the production of neutron sources to be used in radioisotope thermoelectric generators, and not for employing in a nuclear weapons neutron initiator, the plant was kept under routine security at the time of testing.&nbsp. It indicates that the low security was maintained so that actual experiments could not be detected or doubted (Teheran Nuclear Research Center par. 9-10).

An analysis of the fuel needs of the Teheran Research Reactor confirms its yearly LEU needs on the basis of assumptions over the reactor’s working power, its yearly working strength, and the fuel burn-up before spent fuel run (Nuclear Iran par. 1). As per estimates:

3. Since the fuel is 19.75 percent enriched, the measured yearly fuel need is 9.2 to 18.4 kg LEU (uranium mass) in a year. If the reactor worked only at 3 MW, it would need just 5.5 to 11 kg of LEU (uranium mass) in a year.&nbsp. At this reduced power charge, the Argentine-delivered fuel would be sufficient for 10-20 years. Iran had been operating the reactor at a reduced capacity of 3 MH and at a reduced functioning limit factor of 40 percent since 1993 out of compulsion as the Argentine fuel was expected to run out during the next few years

4. If Iran arranged 1,200 kg of LEU (3.5 %) hexafluoride, as published in the media, an enrichment plant could generate nearly 120 kilograms of 19.75 LEU (uranium mass) from it, agreeing to a tails check of 0.71 percent (natural uranium).